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The existence of black market exchange rates of developing countries 
is common knowledge. and the Indian rupee has been traded in an unofficial 
"free" market for along time (Pi ck 1975. p. 239). The emergence of the 
commodities black market in general and the currency black market in par-
ti cul ar is the outcome of offi ci a 1 contro 1 on the free market operati on. 
In the case of the exchange rate, an additional factor is important--a 
government's perception of the currency's prestige. For example, the 
political stability of many governments in the developing countries is 
often at stake when the government decides to devalue currency, even when 
such a decision is economically sound. the possible political opposition 
explains partly why most developing countries opt for a fixed exchange rate 
regime and sticks to the overvalued exchange rate.1 One strong opinion in 
favor of a fixed exchange rate is the following: the developing countries 
cannot fol low an independent course in today's world regarding the exchange 
rate of their currencies. Either they peg their currencies to major world 
currencies, in which case it is a free floating exchange rate as the base 
currency floats, or they fix the exchange rate of their currencies vis-a-
vi s a basket of currenci es, in whi ch case it consti tutes a managed float. 
What the developing countries fear most is the speculation with the 
exchange rate of their currencies. In this case, the country loses 
val uabl e foreign exchange. To safeguard national interest, the country 
chooses a fixed exchange rate regime. Along wi th the fi xed 
exchange rate, an elaborate control mechanism operates in the case of both 
lOut of 146 members of the International Monetary Fund, 51 members 
followed a fixed exchange rate system, 17 members followed a basket of 
currency approach, and on 1 y 38 members fo 11 owed a more fl exi b 1 e exchange 
rate in 1984 (I.I~.F. 1984, p. 9). 
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exports and imports. The potenti all oss of we 1 fare in the form of di s-
tortion in resource allocation is now well established in the literature 
(Bhagawati 1978; Bhagawati and Hansen 1973). One common outcome of these 
control mechanism is the emergence of black market. 
A black market is the euphemism for an illegal market where the price 
of the commodity varies with the officially fixed minimum or maximum price. 
Such a market became very common after the World War II when even the 
mature western economies were subject to widespread control. The theory of 
the black market is analyzed in Boulding (1947), Bronfenbrenner (1947), and 
Michaely (1954). This tool of analysis 'has been applied to explain the 
specific behavior of the black market for foreign exchange in Culbertson 
(1975) and Sheikh (1976). Both model s are based on partial equil ibrium 
analysis and make restrictive assumptions regarding the sources of supply 
to the black market for foreign exchange. Although Sheikh emphasizes smug-
gling and underinvoicing of exports as the main sources, Culbertson 
stresses the resa 1 e of the offi ci all y allocated forei gn exchange. The 
black market exchange rate behavior is analyzed in a macroeconomic frame-
work by Nowark (1984) and Dicki and Noursi (1975). The 1 atter expl ains the 
operati on of offi ci all y sponsored para 1 1 e 1 forei gn exchange market for 
Syria. The analysis has been extended and applied for different countries, 
e.g., Gupta (1981) for India, Dornbusch et ale (1983) for Brazil, and Olgun 
(1984) for Turkey. The black market is integrated with smuggling in Nowak 
(1984) and Pi tt (1984). 
Since the early seventies, the monetary approach dominated expl an-
ation of exchange rate behavior. In the monetarist framework, the exchange 
rate is defined as the relative price of monies. As such, the domestic 
money stock should influence the black market exchange rate. The relation-
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ship between the domestic stock of money and the black market exchange rate 
has been seen as a two-way relationship in the case of exchange control 
economies. Whi 1 e the expectations about the future exchange rate 
adjustment in the black market can influence the domestic demand for money, 
the change in the money supply in the domestic economy is expected to have 
effects on the exchange rate in the black market. Both these aspects have 
been studied theoretically and empirically by Blejer (1978 a, b). 
Regarding the first interrel ationship, Bl ejer (1978 b) has shown that for 
some exchange control regimes the demand for money is significantly reduced 
I 
when the expectations of a black market depreciation of exchange rates 
intensify. In the latter case, the expected return from holding foreign 
currency assets increases and individuals tend to substitute domestic 
assets with foreign ones as the opportunity cost of holding domestic money 
increases. This leads to a reduction in the demand for domestic cash 
balances. One implication of this interlink is the following: any inter-
vention in the black market exchange rate by the government will have 
repercussions in the domestic demand for money, and this wi 11 compl icate 
the effects of any stabilization policies. 
The second aspect of the interrelationship between the change in the 
domestic money supply and the change in the free market exchange rate is in 
1 i ne with the broad monetari st tradi ti on in whi ch monetary vari ab 1 es are 
supposed to influence exchange rate behavior (Frenkel 1976; Dornbusch 1976; 
Mussa 1976). In an exchange control regime where the official · exchange 
rate is fixed, any disequilibrium in the domestic money market in the form 
of an excess supply of money is expected to have a spil lover effect on both 
balance of payment and exchange rate variation (Friedman 1953; Musha 1976). 
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When the official rate is fixed, the latter is reflected through the change 
in the exchange rate in the black market. Thi s aspect has been ana 1 yzed 
within a standard monetarist framework in Blejer (1978 a), where the basic 
hypothesis tested empirically was that the exchange rate in the black 
market is freely determined by market forces and responds to disequilibrium 
in the domestic money market. 
In the monetarist tradition Blejer has used the demand for money 
function in which the interest rate has not been incorporated as an 
argument. But the di versi on of forei gn exchange from the offi ci a 1 market 
to the black market depends on two types of margin of choice. The first is 
between money and goods, and the second is between money and bonds. 
Although the first is relevant for the goods market, the second is relevant 
for the capital market. Blejer has emphasized the first margin of choice, 
because he argues that inflation is predominant for the countries in which 
he tested his model. 
A1 though B1 ejer may be correct within the context of his study, the 
consideration of capital market is important for two reasons. First, in 
the absence of information about illegal trade across national boundaries, 
the latter is not incorporated in the model. Second, on the assumption of 
free movement of capital in the international market, the public diverts a 
porti on of offi ci all y allocated forei gn exchange to earn a profi t. The 
latter depends on the difference between the domestic nominal interest rate 
and that of the foreign country. 
Based on the above argument, it is imperative that we should retain 
the interest rate i the demand for money function. Accordingly, the mone-
tarist model used by Blejer is modified in the present study. The model 
will be applied to the Indian economy. India presents a unique example of 
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a system of elaborate exchange controls under a fixed exchange rate system. 
Over time, the disequilibrium in the domestic money market in the form of 
excess supply of money has created inflation. Moreover, the black market 
exchange rate has deviated consistently from the official exchange rate 
(Figure 1). This relationship has not been explored in India's case. The 
present paper is an attempt to bridge this gap. 
This paper is divided into several sections. Section II presents the 
theoretical framework where the basic model is explained. Section III 
deliberates the data and the empirical results. In the final section, the 
conclusion and the policy implication of this study is presented. 
II. The Theoretical Framework 
We make the following assumptions to keep the model simple. The black 
market is assumed as an outlet for capital transactions that are barred 
from the official market. The small country assumption is retained so that 
the prices of traded goods are exogenously given. There also exists a 
non traded goods sector. There is full employment in the economy and 
monetary disequilibrium does not affect the rate of growth of real income. 
In the money market, the money supply is determined by the 
relationship 
r~ s = k (R + D), ( 1) 
where 
k = money multiplier 
R = foreign exchange reserve 
D = domestic credit component of the monetary base. 
The demand for money is 
Md = P . md ( 2) 
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate Variation ~ 1954~80 (quarterly) 
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and 
(3 ) 
where P equals the price level, r equals the rate of interest, y equals the 
real permanent income, P~ equals the expected rate of domestic inflation, 
and the asteri sk "*" i ndi cates the ti me rate of change of the v ari ab 1 e. 
For stock equilibrium in the money market, the nominal quantity of 
money must be equal, ex post, to the demand for nominal cash balances. To 
satisfy this, the market must clear in each period and this requires the 
flow equilibrium, or 
r~* - M* s - d, 
or by substitution from equations (1) and (2), we obtain 
k* + (1 - r) R* + rD* = p* + md, 
where 
D 
r = ---
R + D 
(4) 
(5) 
It has been establ ished that the nominal money supply is endogenous in a 
small open economy under a fixed exchange rate. The central bank can only 
determi ne the ~ ante quanti ty of money by changi ng the domesti c credi t 
component of the monetary base. This action and the flow demand for real 
ba 1 ances create an ~ ante excess flow suppl y of money. It is to that ex 
ante flow disequilibrium that the publ ic reacts, and this reaction is 
reflected in changes in the foreign exchange reserve (R) through the 
balance of payment. This is long-run adjustment to restore monetary 
balance. In the short run, there is inflation. Therefore, the public 
determines the ex post nominal quantity of money. 
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The above discussion suggests that the operative measure of money 
market disequilibrium should be an ~ ante measure excluding the 
endogenous reaction of the foreign exchange reserve. So the flow monetary 
disequilibrium in the model is measured as the difference between the 
expansion of the domestic credit component and the changes in the demand 
for a real cash balance. 
The aggregate price level is the geometric mean of the prices of 
traded and nontraded goods: 2 
(6 ) 
where B equals the share of traded goods in the total expenditure. 
The rate of domestic inflation can be written as 
p* = B pf + (1 - B) PN· (6a) 
The pri ce of traded goods is exogenous 1 y gi ven and its rate of change is 
determined by the world rate of inflation (P~) and by changes in the 
offi ci a 1 exchange rate (Eo), or by 
Pr = P~ + E~. (7) 
An excess supply of money implies an excess demand for goods. We further 
assume that the excess demand for non traded goods varies monotonically with 
excess demand throughout the economy. We now postulate the fol lowing 
equation for the rate of change of the prices of nontraded goods: 
* * ( *) PN = PT + A rD* + k* - Md ' (8) 
where A is the elasticity of the relative prices to monetary imbalance. 3 
2The distinction between traded and nontraded goods follows 
traditional literature. See Riley (1982). 
3Any change in the price of traded goods will affect the price of 
nontraded goods through elasticity of substitution in factors of production 
in case of production and marginal rate of substitution in consumption. 
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Substituting from equations (7) and (8) and then from the equation 
(6a), gives 
p* = h (P: + E~) + (I - h) (rO* + k* - md), ( 9) 
wh e re h = "T"1 -+~X--+-t ---I ---e~) . 
The supply of foreign exchange in the black market varies positively 
with the profit possibi 1 ity. The 1 atter, again, varies directl y with the 
differential of the official rate and the black market rate. Therefore, we 
postulate the following supply function of foreign exchange to the black 
market 
1 n FS 
Eb 
= d1 + d2 In{_) 
Eo 
where Eb is the black market exchange rate. 
(10) 
The demand for foreign currency depends positively on the return 
derived from holding the asset and is negatively related to the return 
derived from holding the alternative asset. The return from holding 
foreign currency as an asset is a function of the expected rate of 
deprec i ati on in the black market. Further, si nce expectati ons are formed 
in the future, people are likely to anticipate that any expected domestic 
inflation over world inflation will also be transmitted to the exchange 
rate. From thi s consi derati on, we postu 1 ate the fo 11 owi ng expressi on for 
the expected depreciation of the black market exchange rate: 
Eb = (In P - ln Pw - ln Eb) + P; - P~. ( 11 ) 
The net return for holding a foreign asset is the foreign nominal interest 
rate mi nus the opportuni ty cost in the form of domesti c nomi na 1 interest 
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rate. We assume that the nominal interest differential is denominated by 
the variation in the expected rate of inflation. The demand function for 
foreign exchange in the black market is specified as follows: 4 
(12) 
From equations (11) and (12), we obtain 
ln Fg = Cl + C2 (In P - ln Pw - ln Eb + P~) - q P~. (12a) 
If we assume that own return elasticity is equal to alternative cost 
elasticity (q), then (12a) reduces to 
(13) 
From equations (10) and (13) after differentiation, we obtain 
(14) 
(15) 
The flow equilibrium condition in the black market require that 
F~* = F~*, 
and from equations (14) and (15), we have 
d2 (Eb - E~) = C2 (p* - P~ - Eb), 
or 
(16) 
4This specification assumes that no legal risk is involved in dealing 
in the black market since the operation of this market is tolerated by the 
government. 
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Substitution of p* from equation (9) gives 
* 
d2 + C2 h * C2(1 - h) 
E ( ) E (rD* + k* - md* *) b = ----- 0 + ----- - Pw • (17) 
d2 + C2 
Equation (17) formulates the depreciation rate of the black market exchange 
rate as a weighted average of the devaluation rate of the official exchange 
rate and the flow monetary disequilibrium. 
The official exchange rate is regarded by the government as a policy 
instrument and the change in the official rate follows some pol icy 
decision. The latter can be assumed to depend on some form of reaction 
function that is aimed at maximizing government uti 1 ity function. 5 One 
specification of this reaction function may be 
(18) 
o < b < 1. 
When b = 1, there wi 11 be a free fl oati ng exchange rate conformi ng to the 
purchasing power parity doctrine. When b = 0, there will be a fixed 
exchange rate independent of monetary disequilibrium in the domestic 
market. 
If the official exchange rate is endogenously determined by the 
reaction function (18), we can write equation (17) as fol lows: 
From equation (18) and using equation (9), we obtain 
E*o = b(1 - h) [rD* + k* - m*d - P~J. 
1 - t>n 
(19) 
5If the government reacts systematically to a particular macroeconomic 
variable, then there are behavioral functions describing how monetary 
policy responds to these policy goal variable. See Henderson and Turnovsky 
(1972), and Ujii (1978). 
Next, by substituting from equations (19) and (17), we obtain 
or 
where 
(C2 + bd2)(1 - h) E* [ * d* * P*] b = --------- rD + - md - w' 
E* b = 
A = 
(1 - bh)(d 2 + C2) 
(C2 + bd2)(1 - h) 
(1 - bh)(d2 + C2) 
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(20) 
In this form, the rate of depreciation of the bl ack market exchange rate 
depends on the domestic monetary disequilibrium and the world rate of 
inflation. 
Equi 1 ibri um in thi s system wi 11 be achieved when the monetary 
authority expands the money supply in such a rate that the ex ante excess 
flow supply of money is equal to the world rate of inflation. This occurs 
when the rate of expansion of the domestic credit component exceeds the 
growth in the demand for real balances by the world rate of inflation. 
Then the domestic rate of inflation will be at par with the world rate of 
i nfl ati on and both the offi ci a 1 and the black market exchange rate wi 11 
remain constant. 
III. Data and Empirical Result 
The peri od of the present study is from 1954 to 1980. The quarterl y 
data used in this study are from International Financial Statistics, pub-
1 i shed by International Monetary Fund, except the data on national income. 
The quarterly data of India's national income are not available. The 
quarterly data have been estimated fo1 lowing the interpolation procedure as 
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in Boot et ale (1967). The estimation of the model (equation 20) has been 
done with the fol lowing steps: 
The variable m~ is first estimated from equation (3) by using the 
fa 1 1 owi ng 1 i near form: 
Two variables, permanent income (y) and expected rate of infl ation (P:), 
are not observed. They have been estimated by uti 1 izing adaptive 
expectation. 6 
The empirical estimation of the model (Equation 20) has been made on 
the basi s of quarter 1 y data and usi ng both defi ni ti on s of money (H 1 and 
M2).7 The results are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. The explanatory 
vari ab 1 e has been 1 agged once and a further increase in the 1 ag does not 
lead to any improvement of the results. Therefore, only one lag is used. 
The results in both cases (two definitions of money) support the monetarist 
6To estimate the expected rate of infl ation, a traditional adaptive 
expectation hypothesis is used: 
* * * * Pet = 8P t + (1 - B) Pt - 1, where the rate of inflation (P t ) is measured by the percentage change in the consumer price index and S is a constant. 
Permanent income is defined as 
Yt = hYr + (1 - h) Yt - 1, 
where Y ~ is current income and Yt is permanent income, both at constant prices, and h is a constant. To obtain the optimum values of Band h 
kayak transformation is used and regression technique applied. The 
estimated values of Band h gives highest value of R2. These values of 
and h are used to estimat~ · both the permanent income and the expected rate 
of inflation. 
7The broad definition of money M2 consists of M1 and quasi money. The 
1 atter incl udes time deposits in the commercial banks. The data are taken 
from International Financial Statistics. 
Table 1. The black market exchange rate equation, 1954-1980: M1 definition of money 
* A * * * * * * * Eb = 0 + Al (rO + k - md - Pw)t + A2 (rO + d - md - Pw)t-l 
Intercept Al 
1. 1.053 0.413 
Standard error (0.415) (0.092) 
t-statistics (2.538) (4.505) 
2. 0.817 0.402 
Standard error (0.448) (0.092) 
t-statistics (1.821)* (4.381) 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Not significant at the 10 percent level. 
A2 
0.145 
(0.097) 
(1.498)** 
Note: Other t-statistics are significant at the 5 percent level. 
R2 RZ 
0.311 0.298 
0.32 0.31 
F 
23.69 
16.68 
O-H 
Statistic 
1.59 
1.55 
....... 
~ 
Table 2. The black market exchange rate equation, 1954-1980: M2 definition of money 
* * * * * * * * Eb = AO + Al (rD + k - md - Pw)t + A2 (rD + k - md - Pw)t-1 
Intercept Al 
1. 0.692 0.535 
Standard error (0.424) (0.098) 
t-statistics (1.634)* (5.486) 
2. 0.498 0.538 
Standard error (0.472) (0.098) 
t-statistics (1.057)* (5.469) 
*Not significant at the 10 percent level. 
Note: Other t-statistics are significant. 
A2 
0.103 
(0.099) 
(1.04)* 
R2 
0.36 
0.37 
R2 
0.35 
0.35 
F 
29.87 
20.09 
D-W 
Statistic 
1.53 
1.56 
I--' 
CJ1 
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position. as the signs of the coefficients are positive. The positive sign 
of the coefficients prove the theoretical position that a positive rate of 
growth of excess money supply \'lill lead to a depreciation in the black 
market exchange rate. Further, the coefficients are significantly dif-
ferent from zero and in case of one lag, the sum of the coefficients is 
0.55 in case of Ml definition and about 0.64 in the case of the M2 def-
inition. Increasing the lag of the explanatory variable has led to the 
negative sign of the coefficients and therefore not reported here. 
IV. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper is to test the monetarist proposition 
that a disequilibrium in the domestic money market will have a spillover 
effect on the exchange rate of the country. Since India is a fixed 
exchange rate regime. the black market exchange rate can be taken as a 
proxy of free exchange rate. From the result, it is obvious that the 
monetarist proposition holds for the case of India to a significant extent. 
When the official exchange rate becomes flexible, as has been the case in 
India since 1971, this flexibility absorbs some shock of the domestic 
monetary di sequi 1 i bri um. The black market exchange rate is supposed to 
fl uctuate 1 ess and the gap between the two exchange rates shoul d be nar-
rowed down. This has happened in India, which is evident from Figure 1. 
The policy prescription that emerges from this paper is that the government 
should be cautious enough regarding the growth of domestic credit component 
of the monetary base. Any lack of control on the growth of domestic credit 
component will result in the loss of precious foreign exchange as the 
increasing gap between the black market exchange rate and the official rate 
will induce remittances of foreign currency through the unofficial channel. 
17 
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